Francis Rawdon-hastings letter to Henry Clinton, 29 October 1780

Camp between Broad River and the Catawba,

Sir, South Carolina, Oct. 29, 1780.

Lord Cornwallis having been so reduced by a severe fever as to be still unable to write, he has desired that I should have the honour of addressing your Excellency in regard to our present situation.

For some time after the arrival of his Majesty's troops at Camden, repeated messages were sent to head-quarters by the friends of Government in North Carolina, expressing their impatience to rise and join the King's standard. The impossibility of subsisting that additional force at Camden, and the accounts which they themselves gave of the distressing scarcity of provisions in North Carolina, obliged Lord Cornwallis to entreat them to remain quiet till the new crop might enable us to join them. In the mean time General Gates's army advanced We were greatly surprised, and no less grieved, that no information whatsoever of its movements was conveyed to us by persons so deeply interested in the event as the North Carolina loyalists. Upon the 16th of August that army was so entirely dispersed that it was clear no number of them could for a considerable time be collected. Orders were therefore despatched to our friends, stating that the hour they had so long pressed for was arrived, and exhorting them to stand forth immediately, and prevent the reunion of the scattered enemy. Instant aid was in that case promised to them. In the fullest confidence that this event was to take place. Lord Cornwallis ventured to press your Excellency for co-operation in the Chesapeak, hoping that the assistance of the North Carolinians might eventually furnish a force for yet further efforts. Not a single man, however, attempted to improve the favourable moment, or obeyed that summons for which they had before been so impatient. It was hoped that our approach might get the better of their timidity, yet during a long period, whilst we were waiting at Charlotteburgh for our stores and convalescents, they did not even furnish us with the least information respecting the force collecting against us. In short, Sir, we may have a powerful body of friends in North Carolina, and indeed we have cause to be convinced that many of the inhabitants wish well to his Majesty's arms, but they have not given evidence enough — either of their numbers or of their activity — to justify the stake of this province for the uncertain advantages that might attend immediate junction with them. There is too much reason to conceive that such must have been the risk. Whilst this army lay at Charlotteburgh, Georgetown was taken from our militia by the Rebels, and the whole country to the east of Santee gave such proofe of general defection that even the militia of the High Hills could not be prevailed upon to join a party of troops who were sent to protect our boats upon the river. The defeat of Major Ferguson had so dispirited this part of the country, and indeed the loyal subjects were so wearied by the long continuance of the campaign, that Lieut-Colonel Cruger (commanding at Ninety-six) sent information to Lord Cornwallis that the whole district had determined to submit as soon as the Rebels should enter it. From these circumstances, from the consideration that delay does not extinguish our hopes in North Carolina, and from the long fatigue of the troops which made it seriously requisite to give some refreshment to the army, Lord Cornwallis has resolved to remain for the present in a position which may secure the frontier without separating his force. In this situation we shall be always ready for movement whensoever opportunity shall recommend it, or circumstances require it. But the first care must be to put Camden and Ninety-six into a better state of defence, and to furnish them with ample stores of salt provisions. Lord Cornwallis foresees all the difficulties of a defensive war, yet his Lordship thinks they cannot be weighed against the dangers which must have attended an obstinate adherence to his former plan. I am instructed by Lord Cornwallis to express in the strongest terms his Lordship's feelings with regard to the very effectual measures which your Excellency had taken to forward his operations. His Lordship hopes that his fears of abusing your Excellency's goodness in that particular may not have led him to neglect making use of a force intended by your Excellency to be employed by him; but as his Lordship knew not how far your Excellency might aim at other objects in the Chesapeak (to which point his Lordship's entreaty for co-operation was originally confined), he could not think of assuming the power to order Major-General Leslie to the Cape Fear River, though he pointed out the utility of the measure in case it should be conceived in the extent of your Excellency's purpose. I have, &c.,

Rawdon.